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Abstract 
 
The paper attempts to approach the survival of the North Korean regime in the perspective of 
changing legitimation modes and ideological management by the leadership to fill in possible 
'identity vacuum'.  With a content analysis of Rodong Sinmun, the representative North 
Korean newspaper, this paper follows the reformulation process of the legitimising value and 
ideological rationality in North Korea between 1980 and 2004.  It particularly looks at 
changes in the Party discourse, political rhetoric, and the emphasis of the Party policy focus 
during the analytical period in order to trace the leadership's effort to provide new goals, 
vision, and regime legitimacy as a way to overcome crises. On the basis of findings, the 
paper argues that the North Korean regime formulated new rhetoric at different times to 
rationalise its existence, which consequently transformed the nature of the regime from a 
'Juche (self-reliant)’ state to a 'military oriented' one where the 'Songun (military first)' 
ideology established itself as a dominating rhetoric.  In the perspective of legitimation crisis, 
the paper further argues that the process of shifting legitimation modes, through ideological 
manipulation or propaganda management has served the purpose of preventing identity crisis 
and sustaining the North Korean regime thus far. 
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1. Introduction 
For decades, Juche (self-reliance) ideology1 had been a dominating rhetoric and 
guiding principle in North Korea.  It has served as a systemic legitimating value and 
ideological platform whereby the ruling elites could rationalize their policies and authority 
structures.   From the late 1980s, however, dramatic changes in the external environment and 
endogenous crises challenged the existing regime legitimacy in North Korea.  The collapse of 
the communist bloc in the Eastern Europe, followed by the breakdown of the Soviet Union, 
and pursuit of market economy in China altogether threatened the survival of the North 
Korean communist regime.  A series of crises continued with the death of Kim Il Sung 
(1994), the tension over nuclear issue between North Korea and the US (1993-1994), 
leadership change to Kim Jong Il, surmounting economic problems, and natural disasters 
which led millions of people to die of starvation.  Facing the radically changing international 
environment, the North Korean regime needed to shift its legitimation mode as a means to 
rationalize regime continuation.  This included creation of new rationality, replacement of the 
old guiding principle with new rhetoric, and providing an alternative vision.   
 
 The North Korean regime strived to search for a new legitimacy throughout the 
1990s, particularly under the Kim Jong Il leadership.  Constant shifts in the Party discourse 
and emergence of new rhetoric reflected in the North Korean publications substantiate this 
point.  This paper aims to follow such a change through a content analysis of the Party 
newspaper (Rodong Sinmun) editorials from 1980 to 2004, and to discuss its implication in 
the context of regime survival.  On the basis of the study, the paper argues that the North 
Korean regime formulated new rhetoric at different times to rationalise its existence, and in 
doing so, the nature of the regime transformed from a ‘Juche’ state to a ‘military-oriented’ 
one where the ‘Songun (military first)’ ideology established itself as a dominating rhetoric.  
In the perspective of legitimation crisis, the paper further argues that the process of shifting 
legitimation modes, through ideological manipulation or propaganda management, has 
served the purpose of filling in the possible ideological vacuum, therefore, preventing 
identity crisis and sustaining the North Korean regime thus far.   
 
2. Legitimation Crisis   
The legitimacy problem is a factor that is commonly pinpointed in explaining the 
breakdown of the communist system2.  Legitimacy is an abstract concept, but relates to 
normative values/beliefs concerning the authority and the right to rule.  One of the principal 
methods of exercising power in any political system is authority.  Even in a state socialist 
system, leaderships do not entirely rely on coercion, but seek to rule on the basis of authority 
and political order.  The term ‘legitimation’ refers to the process whereby they seek to 
acquire authority or legitimacy.3  Legitimation can be sought in various forms depending on 
                                                 
1 The term Juche is commonly translated from the Korean language as ‘self-reliance’, but it does not lend itself 
to any single, precise definition.  Depending on the context in which it is used it can mean national identity, 
self-reliance, national pride or national assertiveness. The four guiding principles of Juche are autonomy or 
identity in ideology, independence in politics, self-sufficiency in economy, and reliance on Korea’s own forces 
in national defence.  
2 J.F. Brown (1991), Paul Kennedy (1993), pp.230-231; Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, (1996), pp.235-253; 
David Lane (1996), pp.152-187; V. Konotorovich (1993), p.42; G. Di Palma (1991), N.Robinson (1995); 
Steven Saxonberg (2001), pp.143-162.  See the reference section  
3 Leslie Holmes, The End of Communist Power, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p.13 and p.39. 
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the source and means of acquiring legitimacy.  According to Holmes’ classification of 
legitimation4, ten dominant modes of legitimation are pinpointed to have been observed in 
various communist and post-communist societies.  The domestic ones are listed as old 
traditional, charismatic, legal-rational, goal-rational (teleological), eudaemonic, official 
nationalist, and new traditional modes.  For external modes, there are formal recognition, 
informal support, and existence of an external role model.  
 
Table 1. Ten modes of Legitimation 
 
Source of Legitimation Modes of Legitimation 
1. traditional 
2. charismatic 
3. legal-rational 
4. goal-rational (teleological) 
5. new traditional 
6. eudaemonic 
Internal (domestic) 
7. official nationalists 
8. formal recognition 
9. informal support 
External 
10. Self-legitimation: existence of an external role model 
 
The first three modes of legitimation represent Max Weber’s three broad grounds for 
exercising power on which authority is based.  In the traditional form of legitimation, a 
leader claims the right to rule on the basis of a long-established or widely accepted tradition.5  
A monarch and the church typically claiming their rights by reference to some superhuman 
agency (i.e. divine mandate of heaven) or in terms of family tradition are the examples.  The 
dynastic succession from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il in North Korea displays legitimation 
attempt along this line.  In the charismatic mode, legitimacy is based on the charisma of a 
leader.  This legitmation mode depends on a certain quality of an individual personality by 
virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, 
superhuman, or specifically exceptional powers or qualities.6  The communist revolutionary 
leaders (i.e. Lenin, Mao, Ho Chi Min, Kim Il Sung, etc.) who have developed authority on 
the basis of heroism or other exceptional qualities highly esteemed pursued this type of 
legitimation.  The ultimate mode of legitimation in the modern state, according to Weber, is 
the legal-rational form of legitimation.  The political order is legitimated in terms of rules 
and laws that are binding on everyone, thus impersonal norms and a legal order give those in 
authority the right to rule.7  Regular, free, secret, and competitive elections manifest under 
the legal-rational mode of legitimation.  It constitutes the dominant form of legitimation in 
the post-communist societies or other advanced societies.   
 
The term goal-rational (teleological) legitimation is used by T.H. Rigby (1982) to 
describe the dominant form of legitimation in many socialist states, in which the leaders or 
vanguard, seek legitimacy in terms of their ability to steer a given country to the distant end 
                                                 
4 Leslie Holmes, Post-Communism: An Introduction, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), pp.44-45. 
5 M. Weber (1947), The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (New York: the Free Press), p.328 
6 F. Teiwes, Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China, (London: Macmillan, 1984), p.46.  
7 Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol.3, (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 954. 
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goal of communism.  The legitimation in terms of goal-rationality appeared in the earlier 
stages of communist revolution and socialist development, which relied on providing a new 
vision to the masses.  The new traditional form is taken by the communist leaders who 
attempt to enhance their own authority by reference to an earlier phase of the communist era.  
This type of legitimation was practised by Gorbachev when he blamed the previous leaders, 
who distorted the original Leninist aims, for the problems in the Soviet Union, and argue for 
return to the true Leninist path.  Deng Xiaoping often made reference to the early phase of 
Mao Zedong’s leadership of communist China, which can be seen as an example of new 
traditional mode.  Kim Jong Il tended to pursue this type of legitimation after the death of 
Kim Il Sung through constantly praising and reminding achievements and revolutionary 
heritage of the Great Leader. 
  
The eudaemonic mode of legitimation refers to attempts by political leaders to le             
gitimate their rule in terms of the political order’s performance, especially in the economic 
sphere.  Under the eudaemonic mode, leaders appeal to support of the masses on the basis of 
impressive growth rates, better quality and more widely available consumer goods, and 
stability.  This may explain how China’s economic success contributed to the continuation of 
the socialist system and dominance of the communist Party.  The eudaemonic form of 
legitimation is closely related to economic performance, thus it becomes problematic when 
economic reforms fail to produce tangible results.  
  
The official nationalist form of legitimacy relies on nationalism.   Communist 
leaderships who believe that they are failing to legitimate their rule by other modes resorted 
to official nationalism.  Leaders may seek the right to rule by locating themselves in a 
tradition of national hero-leaders or colonial experience.  Nationalism is not a true ideology, 
nevertheless, it provides a framework for many who have lost their usual reference or who 
fear losing their own identity as a consequence.8  The official nationalist and charismatic 
legitimation forms tended to be more obvious in those countries where the communists had 
taken power largely or exclusively by their own efforts than in those where the communists 
had come to power with considerable external, usually Soviet, assistance.   
  
The formal recognition by external powers such as by other states or international 
organizations may also impose legitimacy.  In this case, the leaderships may emphasize the 
fact that they are being admitted to the United Nations (or other international organizations) 
or the leaders’ image as an international statesperson (i.e. Gorbachev).   This mode of 
legitimation generally coexists with other forms of legitimation already identified, more 
likely with the charismatic legitimation.  The informal support for a regime and policies by 
external agents can also give a leader certain legitimacy.  Symbolic gesture of popularity 
abroad, for instance, encouraged Gorbachev to push forward his policies and reforms in the 
late 1980s.  The self-legitimation mode is sought by the leaders who are aware of their 
unpopularity and lack of authority among their own population.  These leaders continue to 
believe in their own right to rule by clinging onto direct or indirect external (informal) 
support and their faith in regime of another country that they are emulating.  This is also 
linked to the existence of an external role model.  This mode is evidently observed in the 
Eastern European countries during the heydays of the USSR.  The formal recognition and 
                                                 
8 On the relationship between nationalism and the ideological vacuum, see J. Hall (1995), pp.86-88 
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self-legitimation modes were more salient in countries in which communism was virtually 
imposed from outside. 
  
Legitimacy problems arise when the dominant legitimation mode fails to have a 
desirable effect.   Legitimation crisis is generally induced by differing factors depending on 
the dominant mode of legitimation pursued.  For instance, economic decline and economic 
reform failure impose a crisis on the eudaemonic form of legitimation.  Death of the 
revolutionary leaders threatens the charismatic form of legitimation.  A rise of an opponent 
group or a new elite or class engenders crisis in a new traditional mode of legitimation.  
Erosion of original and founded ideology generates a crisis in the goal-rational mode of 
legitimation.  External factors, such as Gorbachev’s reforms in the USSR and the Soviet 
leadership to legitimate criticism of the regime, provoked a crisis in Eastern European 
socialist countries that depended on the existence of an external role model and informal 
support.  The collapse of self-legitimation among the communist leaderships of Eastern 
Europe came about when the Soviet leadership itself appeared to have lost its way to 
continue the ruling based on socialist organisational principles.  
 
The factors that threaten the existing legitimacy may cause the leaders to lose faith in 
its ruling or the masses to discredit the system.  However, the legitimation crisis does not 
necessarily lead to system collapse.  The crisis can be overcome in different ways to ensure 
system prolongation.9  Firstly, presence of another group that has sufficient faith in the 
system opens a possibility of leadership change.  When a given leadership team either loses 
faith in itself or resigns, this new group can take over and maintain the system.  If the masses 
believe that such a change will bring genuine improvements, then the overall system’s 
legitimacy gets reinstated.  This may have been observed in the case of a relatively closed 
communist system such as Poland in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.  Secondly, reversion 
to coercion as a mode of exercising power can provide an emergency means to crisis 
management.  When the leadership perceives that legitimating the system to the masses is 
failing to an extent that it endangers continuation of the regime or even the system, it may 
consider reverting to coercion over the masses.  In this case, the leaders have not yet lost 
faith in their capacity to rule despite recognition of their failure to legitimate themselves or 
the system.   The regime in Czechoslovakia from 1969, the imposition of martial law in 
Poland in 1981, and the Tiannamen incident in Beijing in 1989 are the exemplary cases of 
employing the coercive form of overcoming legitimation crisis.10  Thirdly, system collapse 
can be prevented by shifting dominant legitimation modes upon recognising the problematic 
nature of a given form of legitimation.  When the legitimation crisis occurs because those 
running a system lose confidence in the capacity of a particular dominant legitimation mode, 
this type of crisis can be managed as long as they believe they can enhance legitimacy by 
switching to another dominant mode.  The very act of more or less explicitly moving to 
another is observed in many communist countries.  The form of legitimation gradually 
evolved from obtaining popular support to fulfilling goals under the communist leadership.  
The goals varied over time; the leaders dropped their visions of world revolution and 
switched to non-revolutionary goals such as superior economic performance.  A change from 
teleological to eudaemonic form of legitimation in Eastern Europe in the 1970s with market 
                                                 
9 These are summarised from different scenarios suggested by Holmes (1997), pp. 52-58 
10 L. Holmes (1997), Ibid, pp.52-54. 
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socialist reforms and to self-legitimation mode in the 1980s is one example.  A constant 
switch from charismatic to goal-rational, new traditional, coercive, and eudaemonic modes 
was the case in China.  According to Holmes, an act of switching to another mode of 
legitimation provides a regime some ‘breathing space’.11  The process, therefore, can divert 
the attention of the masses from problems of the existing legitimation mode, and renew 
people’s faith in the system.      
 
Legitimation crisis leads to a system collapse if the leaders fail to overcome 
legitimacy problems by one of the means mentioned above.  The system collapse also occurs 
if attempts to enhance system legitimacy fail over time by internal and external factors and/or 
if the capacity of leaderships to keep switching to new forms of legitimation is limited.  Due 
to the nature of top-down legitimation in a communist system, ruling elites’ loss of 
confidence in the legitimacy of its own domination and faith in the system is especially fatal.  
When the leaders are exposed to identity crisis12, they are deprived of willingness to seek an 
alternative legitimation mode.  Failure to re-establish legitimacy due to an “identity 
vacuum”13 in the ruling bloc inevitably generates system collapse.   
To conclude, some generalizations can be drawn within the legitimation crisis context.  
Firstly, the legitimation crisis occurs when the dominant mode of legitimation is threatened 
by certain economic, political, social, and external factors.  Secondly, the legitimation crisis 
can possibly be overcome either by reverting to coercion or by shifting to another mode of 
legitimation.  Thirdly, the system collapses when the leaders fail to manage legitimation 
crisis successfully because they lose faith in what it is doing and in the very system it is 
supposed to maintain.   Survival of the North Korean regime may be understood in this 
context.  
 
3. The North Korean Case – Crisis management and Legitimation under 
 Kim Jong Il 
The North Korean regime was largely founded upon charismatic and official 
nationalist modes of legitimation.  The historical background of regime formation, in which 
Kim Il Sung was regarded as national liberator from the Japanese colonisation, endowed the 
North Korean regime with strong popular support in the early years of communist 
development.  These modes of legitimation persisted throughout the Kim Il Sung’s reign with 
                                                 
11 L. Holmes (1997), op.cit.  
12 Legitimation crisis theory was originally developed primarily with reference to capitalism.  The German 
Marxist, Jürgen Habermas, and a leading member of the Frankfurt school, identifies four possible crisis 
tendencies: economic crisis, rationality crisis, motivation crisis, and legitimation crisis.  The former two are 
defined as system crisis and the latter two as identity crisis.  His conceptualisation draws inferences that system 
crises could be potentially contained when the economic system can develop an independent dynamic and can 
take the lead with endogenously produced system, whereas identity crises are fatal in maintaining the existing 
political legitimacy, thus often result in the collapse of the entire system.  Applicability of his legitimation crisis 
theory to another system (i.e. socialist system) follows a similar logic.  See J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 
(London: Heinemann, 1976)  
13 For the discussion of this concept, see G. Di Palma (1991), pp.49-80.  Di Palma has maintained that the 
regime change occurred when the ruling elites lost their will to rule.  Since the socialist regimes in the Eastern 
European countries were imported products, the self-legitimation or legitimation from the top eroded when the 
ruling elites felt the loss of global partnership by the collapse of neighbouring regimes.    
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enhanced personality cult and ideological indoctrination of the masses.  Though some 
coercive measures accompanied, the regime legitimacy based on charismatic leadership and 
anti-imperialist nationalism continued for decades.  In the 1960s and 1970s, Kim Il Sung also 
enjoyed the goal-rational and eudaemonic modes of legitimation when the mass-mobilized 
economic campaigns resulted in superior economic performance to the capitalist south.  A 
conviction of ‘superiority of the socialist system over alternative systems’ and recognition of 
its ‘Juche’ state from the international community increased the regime legitimacy.  
 
With declining economic performance in the 1980s, the eudaemonic mode of 
legitimation began to fade.  With the collapse of the socialist bloc, the goal-rational and 
external recognition modes of legitimation were at stake.  With the death of the Great leader, 
the charismatic mode of legitimation was lost.  The North Korean regime inevitably faced a 
situation in which it had to seek a new mode of legitimation, or create one, if necessary.  One 
of the ways to follow the process of the North Korean leadership searching for rationality is 
through scrutinizing the North Korean publications.14  Rodong Sinmun, published by the 
Workers’ Party Central Committee, is one useful material in tracking down the Party’s 
political orientation, policy lines, ideological propagandas and important issues that concern 
the regime.  Its editorials, in particular, function to guide the Party members and persuade the 
North Korean people to follow the Party’s intentions.  Therefore, they explicitly reveal the 
direction of Party policy, present the view of the official position of the Party and the regime, 
and notify important Party decisions to the public.   
 
A content analysis of Rodong Sinmun editorials is designed to show how the 
emphasis of the Party’s policy focus has changed over time and to outline the change in the 
Party discourse and political rhetoric in North Korea, which may mirror the reformulation 
process of the legitimising value and ideological rationality.  The analysis also attempts to 
identify relative prominence of selected political symbols in remoulding the unitary 
ideological framework and to delineate the kind of discourse the Party uses to rationalise the 
socialist regime in North Korea.  The total number of editorials studied is 3,364; every 
editorial printed in Rodong Sinmun from 1 January 1980 to 31 December 2004 is considered 
for the analysis for greater accuracy and more validity. The Party newspaper is published 
daily but carries editorials15 three to four times a week.  As displayed in table 2, the total 
number of editorial varied from year to year.16   
 
 
 
                                                 
14 The centrally-controlled press in communist states can reflect the attitudes of the elite, at least indirectly, in 
order for it to be used to mobilise support and set the general policy line.  Therefore, content analysis of 
communist documents can be a fundamental tool for analysing and predicting the policies of communist states.  
See W. DeB Mills (1985), pp. 81-92. 
15 The editorials usually appear on the front page, exceptionally being on the second page.  They are relatively 
easy to identify because they appear with a fixed format with the word “sasul (editorial),” appearing on the 
upper left corner of an editorial headline. 
16 The number of editorials significantly decreased from 1994 as a result of some changes in the editing style. 
This change, however, did not cause major problems to the main objectives of the analysis since important 
policy directives continued to be discussed exclusively in the editorials. 
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Table 2. Number of Editorials Studied17 
  
1980s 1990s 2000-2004 
Year Number of  
Editorials 
Year Number of  
Editorials 
Year Number of 
Editorials 
1980 177 1990 209 2000 59 
1981 169 1991 189 2001 56 
1982 164 1992 181 2002 102 
1983 197 1993 138 2003 81 
1984 190 1994 75 2004 84 
1985 201 1995 78   
1986 210 1996 66   
1987 178 1997 76   
1988 182 1998 52   
1989 184 1999 66   
Total 1,852 Total 1,130 Total 382 
1980-2004 Total: 3,364 editorials 
 
Editorials discuss the most important issues the Party wishes to bring to people’s 
attention and to propose new policy directives.18  The first step of the analysis is 
categorization of the editorials depending on the dominant issue discussed in the content.19  
The editorials are classified into six broad categories: politics, society, economy and sciences, 
military, inter-Korea relations, and foreign relations.  These are again divided into 34 sub-
categories, which are defined in the table below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 From 1994, a significant decrease in the number of editorials is noticeable.  This is partially due to changes in 
the editing style.  Since the collapse of the socialist bloc, Rodong Sinmun designated the whole of its last page 
to denunciation of South Korea, the U.S., and the imperialists as well as cynically reporting the misery 
bestowed upon people of the former socialist countries consequent on abandoning socialism.  Additionally, 
since the death of Kim Il Sung, Rodong Sinmun dedicated the second page to commemorate great achievements 
of the supreme leader and the teachings left behind by the Great leader.  The whole page was filled with praise 
and memories of the Great leader and glorification stories about Kim Il Sung.  
18 All North Koreans are obliged to study the Rodong Sinmun editorial thoroughly everyday and be acquainted 
with new policies and decisions of the Party and the state.  Under the guidance of a Party cadre from the Party 
direction & control sector, a political study session is organised every morning in every workplace and 
organisation for all the people to study the editorial.  For details of the political study session at workplace, see 
Helen-Louise Hunter (1999) chapter 13. 
19 The editorial headings explicitly summarize and specify the major theme of the content, which helps the 
categorization procedure.  
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Table 3. Categorization Scheme 
 
Main categories Sub-categories 
1.1. Idolization of the top leader; Personality cult; praise of leadership ability and  
       achievements  
1.2. Superiority of the Party and Party leadership. 
1.3. Superiority of the socialist system and the regime; Defense of our 
       (the North Korean) style of socialism 
1.4. Loyalty, Solidarity, and Unity 
1.5. Ideology; Ideological Learning 
1.6. Political tasks, Party policy propaganda, Party policy realization 
1.7. Role of the Party organization and the cadres 
1. Politics 
1.8. Political Participation 
2.1. Social morals; Socialist Life style; Collectivism 
2.2. Revolutionary spirit; Optimism; Mass-line.  
2.3. Social welfare system, healthcare 
2.4. Class (workers; intelligentsia); class consciousness 
2.5. History, culture, art, sports 
2.6. Education; Youth 
2.7. Women; Family 
2. Society 
2.8. Mass Media 
3.1. Economic Development; Economic Tasks, Economic Policy; Planning 
3.2. Industry and Energy 
3.3. Communication and Transportation 
3.4. Construction and Land development 
3.5. Agriculture; Farming; Livestock Raising; Fishery 
3.6. Foreign Trade 
3.7. Role and attitude of workers and directors 
3.8. Mining and Forestry 
3. Economy and Science 
3.9. Science; technological development 
4.1. Ties of friendship with other nations 
4.2. Anti-imperialist struggle; Anti-American struggle 
4. Foreign Relations 
4.3. Anti-nuclear peace 
5.1. Importance and Superiority of the People’s Army 
5.2. Military Events 
5. Military  
5.3. Military Line; Self-Defense Policy  
6.1. Reunification issues 
6.2. Nationalism 
6. Inter-Korea 
    Relations 
6.3. Propaganda against the South 
Note: In case of 4.1 and 4.2, specify the country mentioned and the attitude towards: 
1. United States    2. South Korea   3. Japan   4. USSR (Russia)   5. China    
6. Eastern Europe   7. Africa and Latin America   8. Western Europe (E.U.)   
9. Vietnam and Cuba (other survivors)     10. Imperialists  
(attitude: cnegative dpositive eneutral) 
 
The proportion of editorials in each category in each year is put together to pinpoint 
the issues that were most important to the North Korean leadership at different times (see 
table 4).  The changing proportion of issues discussed in Rodong Sinmun editorials is more 
clearly illustrated in graph 1 along with a time scale of significant internal and external 
events.   It is noticeable at first sight that there was a major shift in the policy focus from 
economy to politics in the 1990s. Though the proportion of editorials on the issues of 
economy and foreign relations increased slightly between 2000 and 2002, discussion of 
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political issues remained dominant in the new century.   Such a change tends to reflect 
internal and external events that affected the North Korean regime and also a shift in the 
legitimation mode the regime pursues.   
 
Table 4. Categorisation of the Editorials: by issue and by year 
 
*The highest percentage of each year is highlighted.  
Year Politics Society 
(%) 
Economy (%) Foreign 
Relations (%)  
Military (%) Inter-Korea (%) 
1980 21.5 9.6 53.7 8.5 0.6 6.2 
1981 17.2 9.5 53.8 13 0.6 5.9 
1982 17.1 6.1 56.7 14.6 0.6 4.9 
1983 13.7 7.1 56.3 18.8 0.5 3.6 
1984 15.8 10.5 51.1 15.8 0.5 6.3 
1985 18.9 12.4 51.7 10.9 0.5 5.5 
1986 13.8 10 51.4 18.1 1 5.7 
1987 19.7 8.4 55.6 7.9 1.1 7.3 
1988 15.4 13.2 51.6 9.3 0.5 9.9 
1989 19.6 14.7 49.5 10.3 0.5 5.4 
1990 25.8 14.4 45.9 6.7 1.4 5.7 
1991 28.6 13.8 41.3 7.4 1.6 7.4 
1992 38.1 18.8 28.2 5 1.7 8.3 
1993 42.8 18.8 20.3 5.1 5.1 8 
1994 54.7 12 17.3 4 4 8 
1995 65.4 14.1 5.1 1.3 2.6 11.5 
1996 40.9 27.3 12.1 4.5 4.5 10.6 
1997 40.8 25 18.4 0 5.3 10.5 
1998 42.3 21.2 11.5 3.8 5.8 15.4 
1999 33.3 28.8 18.2 6.1 6.1 7.6 
2000 45.8 22 15.3 6.8 3.4 6.8 
2001 39.3 14.3 17.9 16.1 7.1 5.4 
2002 44.1 17.6 18.6 6.9 8.8 3.9 
2003 40.7 14.8 30.9 8.6 3.7 1.2 
2004 50.0 11.9 26.2 7.1 2.4 2.4 
1980s 
(1980-1989) 
17.2 10.2 53.1 12.9 0.6 6.0 
1990s  
(1990-1999) 
38.1 18.0 27.4 5.0 3.1 8.4 
21st Century 
(2000-2004) 
44.2 22.8 15.4 8.6 5.5 3.0 
Year Politics Society 
(%) 
Economy (%)  Foreign 
Relations (%) 
Military  
(%)  
Inter-Korea (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
  10 
Figure 1. Issues discussed in Rodong Sinmun Editorials 1980-2004 
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As shown in the figure, editorials on economy-related subjects were constantly and 
significantly stressed in the 1980s; other issues were less frequently discussed and military 
issues were seldom discussed.  The 1980s was the period in which the North Korean regime 
mainly concentrated on economic and industrial developments through mass mobilization.  
The most important agitation work done by the newspaper was in connection with the 
acceleration of production and development of the socialist economy.  More than half of the 
editorials from 1980 to 1989 were concerned with economic matters, stressing the role and 
attitude of workers in accomplishing the proposed economic tasks.   It appears that goal-
rational set the dominant mode of legitimation during this period of time.   North Korea also 
actively engaged in diplomatic affairs with African socialist countries, Eastern European 
countries and the Soviet Union in the 1980s.  Friendship ties with these countries were 
frequently and positively mentioned in the editorials, and the unity and solidarity of the 
socialist camp and mutual cooperation with new independent countries of Asia, Africa and 
Latin America were repeatedly stressed in the Party newspaper.  Frequent reports of 
receptions of foreign visitors and visits of Kim Il Sung to Eastern European countries and to 
the USSR in the newspaper signalled vigorous diplomatic activities of the North Korean 
regime and pursuit of foreign recognition mode of legitimation.  
 
This trend shifts in the 1990s where the proportion of editorials on the issues of 
politics and society drastically increased while those on economy and foreign relations 
decreased significantly.  Interestingly, the political issue line and economic issue line 
intersects in 1992, the year following the disintegration of the USSR, reflecting the regime’s 
effort to avoid the regime collapse by diverting its focus from economic to political issues.  It 
signifies the beginning of shift in the legitimation modes, recognizing limits of the existing 
legitimation modes in the changing environment.  Discussion of political issues reached its 
climax in 1994, which can be explained by two critical events that took place in this year: 
death of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung and heightened tension over nuclear issues between 
North Korea and the U.S.  In dealing with this particular time of crisis, the political issues 
were discussed to the greatest extent, accentuating unity and loyalty in safeguarding the 
North Korean socialist system.  Perception of external threats, particularly from the U.S., was 
largely employed to rationalize actions of the leadership.   
 
Idolization of both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il increased after the death of Kim Il 
Sung in 1994, but more significantly during the period of leadership change.  Kim Il Sung’s 
achievements and revolutionary struggles are constantly praised while Kim Jong Il’s 
extraordinary traits and capability are lauded.  A strong emphasis on the greatness of Kim 
Jong Il may have been intended to legitimize the leadership succession based on the new 
traditional mode and to consolidate people’s loyalty to the new leader.  Pursuit of the new 
traditional mode of legitimation is apparent in the North Korean Constitution that was 
amended in September 1998 on the occasion of Kim Jong Il’s official succession to power.  
It was entitled “Kim Il Sung Constitution”, intending to perpetuate the late Kim Il Sung’s 
legacy (see the preamble of the 1998 constitution). It elevated Kim Il Sung posthumously to 
the rank of “Eternal President” and thus perpetual head of state, “Suryong”.  Accordingly, the 
basis of legitimacy of the Kim Jong Il leadership was to continue and complete the 
revolutionary cause Kim Il Sung has carried out throughout his life time.  The official 
nationalist mode of legitimation is additionally sought by the North Korean leadership 
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through emphasizing its socialist revolutionary heritage and extensively calling for 
revolutionary spirit and nationalist sentiment of the people.  
 
Also evident from the newspaper is that North Korea isolated itself in its international 
relations since the collapse of the socialist bloc.  The number of editorials that dealt with 
foreign relations drastically declined in the 1990s.  The USSR, Russia and the Eastern 
European countries were hardly mentioned in the editorials after 1991.  China was mentioned 
relatively frequently in 1991 and 1992, perhaps intending to accentuate another surviving 
socialist state.  The number of editorials on China, however, decreased continuously from 
1993.  Vietnam, Cuba and China were occasionally mentioned in the editorials throughout 
the 1990s possibly to assure North Korea’s friendship ties with these countries.  Yet, the 
editorials ceased to express strong favoritism towards these countries or articulate resolute 
political-economic solidarity with these countries.  Interesting to note is that the newspaper 
editorials never mentioned the reforms that were taking place in Eastern Europe, Russia, or 
China up to 2000.  It appears that the North Korean regime has firmly adhered to its closed-
door policies, sealing itself off from the rest of the world to prevent any outside ideology and 
culture from infiltrating into North Korean society.    
 
From 2000, all the lines in the graph fluctuate (see figure 1), implying changing 
emphasis and policy goal in the new century.  Although political issues were still dominantly 
discussed, the emphasis has shifted from “safeguarding the North Korean style socialism” to 
“Party policy propaganda” and “the role of the Party organization and cadres in directing 
important political tasks.”  The proportion of economic issues increased from 2000, and 
overtook that of social issues in 2001.  This coincided with Kim Jong Il’s proposal of new 
economic development in North Korea, which stresses practicality, IT industry, science and 
technology.  The so-called “renovation in thinking” in building an economically prosperous 
country first appeared in the Rodong Sinmun editorial on January 4, 2001, in which Kim Jong 
Il called for “solving problems from a new perspective and a new height.”  Since then, the 
need for “fundamental change in the way of thinking and the working style” has been 
constantly emphasized in the editorials.  The newspaper began to mention China more 
frequently from 2000, and even started to praise its remarkable economic developments.20  
Achievements of the economic building in China and success stories of Chinese economic 
reforms were reported regularly in an assigned special column in the newspaper from 
January 2001.  Considering that the newspaper never before reported the reform in China, it 
was surprisingly a new phenomenon.  It was clear that the North Korean leadership 
attempted to bring the attention back to reconstruction of the economy based on a new 
strategy of development in the new century.  Such a drastic shift of the regime focus 
coincided with North Korea’s bold economic reform measures in July 2002.   
 
Another noticeable feature in the graph is a considerable increase in the discussion of 
foreign relations issues, particularly in 2001.  Many significant events took place between 
2000 and 2002, which marked a turning point in North Korea’s foreign affairs: the historical 
North-South Korea summit in June 2000; the visit of the U.S. secretary of state, Madeleine 
                                                 
20 It is evaluated in the North Korean publication that “China has achieved a unique socialist development with 
social unity and stability under the leadership of the Communist Party, and as a result, the status of China is 
continuously elevating in the international stage.”  See Rodong Sinmun January 23, 2001.  
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Albright, to Pyongyang in the same year; Putin’s visit to North Korea in 2000; the chairman 
Kim Jong Il’s visits to China in May 2000 and January 2001; Kim Jong Il’s visit to Russia in 
July 2001; the Chinese leader Jiang Zemin’s visit to Pyongyang in September 2001; visit of 
senior officials of the European Union to Pyongyang in May 2001; the president Kim Young 
Nam’s visit to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in May 2002; and the Japanese prime minister 
Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in September 2002, in which the Japan and North Korea 
Pyongyang declaration was signed.  Compared to the 1990s, North Korea noticeably 
concentrated on improving its relations with South Korea and China, and on expanding its 
diplomatic ties with other western countries and the EU member states21.  North Korea’s 
changed attitude and active engagement in the international community signalled pursuit of 
foreign recognition in the new century.  
 
The new trend, however, was short-lived.  An attempt to return to economic issues 
and foreign relations was taken over by remerging security concerns and perception of threat 
surrounding another nuclear tension between the US and North Korea from 2002.   The Bush 
administration’s rhetorical hostility towards the Kim Jong Il regime provided an excuse for 
the North Korean leadership to place its top priority back to regime survival and security.  
From 2002, emphasis on “military-first politics” and “military-oriented thought” was greatly 
intensified as political rhetoric.22  The inclination of prioritizing the military and building a 
militarily strong state becomes evident when one considers specific rhetoric the North 
Korean regime promotes in the new century.  This subject is considered more in detail in the 
next section.   Apparent in the analysis of newspaper editorials of 2003 and 2004 is the 
typical pattern the North Korean regime shows when it perceives external threat: first, 
discussion of socio-political issues dominates over economic and foreign issues.  Second, the 
military is prioritized as a means to crisis management.  The present North Korean regime 
appears to rely heavily on perception of threat as a new type of legitimation mode.  
 
 
4. Change in the Party Discourse in North Korea: Editorial Heading Analysis 
Repetitively and frequently used terms and rhetoric in the Party publication at a 
particular time may reveal the regime’s instrumental rationality for legitimation.  The 
analysis of editorial headings attempts to identify such repetitive and significant 
propagandistic themes and political symbols.  In the absence of standardized schemes of 
classification, the terms that are repetitively and frequently found in the editorials headings 
from 1980 and 2004 are selected and counted (see table 5). The analysis delineates certain 
words that the regime stressed and utilized at different time period in a chronological order.  
This is outlined in figure 2.       
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 By 2004, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has diplomatic relations with 24 out of 25 EU 
member states.  France is the only member state that has not established formal diplomatic relations with the 
DPRK 
22 The military-oriented rhetoric was largely discussed as a part of political and social matters, therefore, it 
contributed to increasing discussion of political and social issues rather than the military issues. 
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Table 5. Selected Prominent Terms and Symbols in editorials headings 
 
Category Terms Code 
Politics and Ideology Unity  
Loyalty 
Party and Leadership (Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il) 
Juche Ideology 
Marxism Leninism 
Self-reliance and Independence 
Propaganda 
Our-Style Socialism 
Red Banner Ideology 
Strong & Prosperous Nation Building  
Military-first Ideology 
1 
2 
21 (19+20) 
6 
22 
8 
3 
9 
13 
14 
18 
Economy and  
Development 
Economic Construction 
Building Socialism 
Mass movement and economic campaign 
Self-reliant Economy 
New Thinking and Science 
24 
23 
25+26 
7 
28 
Society and 
Social Attitude 
Revolutionary 
Confidence & optimism 
Desperate (painful) march 
Superiority of Socialism 
12 
16 
17 
15 
International National unification  
International solidarity 
Anti-imperialism 
war 
4 
5 
10 
11 
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Figure 2. Change in Regime Legitimacy and Rhetoric 1980-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Throughout the 1980s, the phrases which most frequently appeared in the editorial 
headings were “mass movement,” “international solidarity,” and “anti-imperialism.”  Mass 
movement was encouraged greatly throughout the 1980s as a mobilization measure, 
intending to spur production and to drive people towards the construction of socialism and 
economic development of the nation.  Anti-imperialism along with international solidarity 
were strongly emphasized in the early 1980s, representing the attitude of North Korea during 
1980 
1990 
2000 
1980-1989 Mass Movement 
  Anti-Imperialism  
International Socialist Solidarity 
1987-1989 Revolutionary Spirit 
1989-1992 Superiority of Socialism  
1990-1993 Confidence and Optimism 
                  Our-style Socialism 
1991-1995 Unity and Loyalty 
       Party Leadership 
 
1995-2004 Military-First Politics 
1996-1997 Red Banner Ideology 
1996-1998 March under Trial 
      Desperate March for Socialism 
 
1998- 2004    Kangsung Daeguk 
(a great country that is militarily strong and 
economically prosperous) 
Juche Ideology  
(National identity, independence, or Self-Reliance) 
Before 1980 
2001-2003 Renovation in thinking and in practice 
2001-2003 IT Science and technology-oriented Economy 
2001-2002 Resurgent (reconstruction) of a Strong Country 
         Kangsung Buhung / Buhung Kanguk 
1995-2004 Military-First thought (Ideology) 
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the Cold War.  Rodong Sinmun editorials put strong emphasis on an “uncompromising” 
struggle against imperialists in order to heighten the anti-imperialist attitude of the people 
and to justify various policies and practices with reference to the social goals of the time.  
Using the term “international solidarity,” the North Korean regime repeatedly called for unity 
of the socialist camp and for the solidarity of international communism in this particular time 
of East-West conflict.  Between 1987 and 1989, the “revolutionary spirit” of servicemen, 
workers and people was called for to complete the economic tasks and to safeguard North 
Korean socialism.  The term “revolutionary spirit” was used in this period primarily to 
encourage people to meet the set plan target and to complete economic tasks.   
  
The discourse of the Party changed considerably in the 1990s, the period of struggle 
for regime survival.  The slogans and propagandistic themes that were associated with 
national economic development and socialist construction appeared less.  Instead, various 
forms of rationalisation appeared in the 1990s from “a socialist system in our own style” to 
“Kangsungdaeguk - building a strong and prosperous nation”.  Whereas ideological learning 
of ‘Juche’ set a dominant political discourse till the 1980s, constant changes in the 
propagandistic themes characterized the 1990s.  The period between 1989 and 1995 was the 
most critical time for the North Korean regime since it faced the task of safeguarding its 
socialist system from a domino-like collapse of socialism elsewhere.  This meant creating a 
persuasive discourse to sustain the regime and the status quo at the time of crisis.  North 
Korea managed to do this in three ways: by differentiating its socialist system from that of 
other failed state socialist states; by stressing the superiority of North Korean socialism; and 
by appealing to stronger social and ideological integration.  Slogans that were frequently 
emphasised in this period were “superiority of socialism,” “our-style socialism,” “confidence 
and optimism,” and  “unity and loyalty to the Party and the leadership.”  A sudden rise of 
these terms as political rhetoric is clearly displayed in the graph below. 
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Figure 3.  Propaganda and Rhetoric in Rodong Sinmun editorials 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
198
0
198
1
198
2
198
3
198
4
198
5
198
6
198
7
198
8
198
9
199
0
199
1
199
2
199
3
199
4
199
5
199
6
199
7
199
8
199
9
200
0
200
1
200
2
200
3
200
4
Year
Pe
rce
nta
ge
Party& leadership
our- style socialism
confidence & optim ism
Unity & loyalty
Desperate March
Strong & prosperous N
New Thinking&science
 
 Subsequent to the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the 
North Korean regime proclaimed the supremacy of “socialism in our own style” (Urisik 
Sahuijuyui).  Serving as an ideological base to safeguard the North Korean regime, this new 
concept represented a unique brand of socialism based on the independent line and isolation 
policy that was immanent in the Juche thought, which differentiated itself from the socialism 
of other countries.  The downfall of socialism elsewhere was explained as “a result of 
imperialists infusing the values of bourgeois liberalisation into the socialist countries...”  
Therefore, the leadership argued that “propagated socialism of our style as the original and 
superior system based on the most sophisticated Juche thought alone can guarantee 
independent and creative lives of people.”23   The leadership further urged people to 
“struggle till the end to protect the socialist system and complete the socialist cause with 
unity among the leader, Party and people.”  Confronting the changing environment, the North 
Korean regime managed to persist not by adaptation to these changes but through an 
emphasis on the superiority and particularity of the North Korean regime, under the name of 
“socialism of our own style” and “the supremacy of the Korean nation.”  Following the 
collapse of the socialist bloc, the leadership also concentrated on strengthening the unity and 
cohesion of society.  Between 1990 and 1995, the supremacy and legitimacy of the Party and 
the leadership was unceasingly stressed in the editorials, and the regime persistently called on 
its people to have “confidence and optimism” in the “victorious our-style socialism” and 
urged “unity and loyalty to the Party and the leadership.”  
 
                                                 
23 Kim Jong Il, in May 1991, proposed the term and further developed the slogan in an address delivered before 
members of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party. Kim Jong Il, “Socialism of Our Style, Centered on 
the Masses, is always Victorious and Invincible,” Rodong Sinmun, 27, May 1991. 
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From mid-1990s, new concepts appeared and replaced the political rhetoric employed 
in the early 1990s to prevent the regime collapse.  This marked the beginning of a new 
ideological remoulding process.  For instance, the concepts of “military-oriented thought,” 
“army-centered politics”,  and “military first politics” began to prevail following Kim Jong 
Il’s inauguration as the supreme commander of the People’s Army and chairman of the 
National Defence Committee.  The “military-first (Songun) politics” imply politics that put 
priority on the military and on strengthening the People's Army as the “main pillar” of 
revolution and the “driving force” of the North Korean brand of socialism.  Although the 
term “military-first politics” first emerged as a way to rationalize the role of the military in 
defending the regime from the external threat, it later developed into an ideology that 
legitimizes a significant increase in the role and influence of the military over general affairs 
in North Korea.  The rising representation of the military in the ruling elite and the 
ascendancy of military generals in the power hierarchy were also rationalized by the military 
first rhetoric.  As the Kim Jong Il leadership relied dominantly on military power in 
managing the crises, the North Korean regime transformed into a military oriented state in 
which the “military-first” thought provided a substantial rationality for its actions and 
changing political procedure.  As shown in figure 4, the military-first rhetoric became 
intensified after the accusation of North Korea being a rogue state and a part of the “axis of 
evil” by the Bush administration in January 2002.  The drastic rise of the ‘military-first’ 
rhetoric and the intensified tone of anti-imperialism in the newspaper in 2002 and 2003 
appeared to be the consequence of the Bush administration’s hard-line policy towards North 
Korea.  The ‘military-first’ ideology continued to dominate over the North Korean society 
and political rhetoric throughout 2004; its prevalence in all aspects of the present North 
Korean regime parallels the ‘Juche’ ideology in the 1970s.    
 
The “Red Banner ideology” was another new concept, which was intensively 
emphasized for rather a short period of time (between 1996 and 1997 – see figure 4).  The 
red banner symbolises the fundamental principle of the Korean revolution for socialism 
based on consistent unity, integrity and faith.  Facing the regime crisis generated by the 
worsening economic situation, the leadership highlighted the “red banner” slogan as the logic 
of safeguarding the system.  Considering that North Korea was preparing for Kim Jong Il’s 
formal succession to power around this period of time, presenting the red banner philosophy 
as the governing ideology was intended to call for unconditional loyalty to the new leader 
and to legitimise the leadership succession.  The emphasis on the term “red banner,” however, 
drastically decreased from 1998.  North Korea introduced another slogan called “Painful 
March for Socialism,” which was in full swing between 1996 and 1998.  In the emergency 
situation following the death of Kim Il Sung, North Korea launched a campaign called the 
“march under trials,” the march referring to Kim Il Sung’s hardship during the anti-Japanese 
struggles.  The slogan “arduous march for socialism” was a variation of “march under trials,” 
which was designed to overcome urgent economic difficulties and to encourage people’s 
morale.  The fact that the frequency of this slogan reached its height in 1998 reflects the 
extremely difficult situation in North Korea created by severe economic hardship and natural 
disasters.  The desperate effort of the leadership to rationalise the situation and appeal to 
people’s patience is reflected in this particular catchphrase.   
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From 1998, the North Korean leadership came up with a brand new slogan 
“Kangsong Daeguk.”    The term literally means “a powerful and prosperous nation,” but 
implies turning North Korea into a great country that is militarily strong and economically 
prosperous.  The term first appeared in an editorial in September 1998 under the heading of 
“Let’s construct Kangsong Daeguk as led by the great leadership of the Party.”  As figure 3 
demonstrates, the term became a dominant rhetoric in the North Korean regime, particularly 
in 1999.  The North Korean leadership’s call for turning North Korea into Kangsong Daeguk 
came at a time when its economic circumstances remained extremely adverse, with serious 
food shortages and lacklustre industrial activities.  By proposing a new task of building North 
Korea into an economically and militarily strong country, the North Korean leadership may 
have attempted to give hope, new goals, and alternative visions to the people, turning to the 
goal-rational mode of legitimation.  The “Kangsong Daeguk” slogan prevailed even in 2001-
2002, though its synonyms “Buhung Kangguk” and “Kangsong Buhung” (resurgence of a 
strong country) were employed interchangeably.   
 
Upon setting a goal towards which the country should move, a new direction of 
change in the economy was proposed as a means to transforming the county into a “strong 
and prosperous country”.  Phrases such as “renovation in thinking and in practice” and “IT 
industry, science and technology-oriented economy” make sudden appearances in the 
newspaper from 2001.  In January 2001, Kim Jong Il urged, for the first time, that  “we 
should transcend the old working style and fixed economic framework of other countries in 
old times” and that “there must be fundamental renovation in our way of thinking, 
ideological stance and work style to meet the demand of the new century”24 In the same 
month, Kim Jong Il made an observational tour to the Shanghai and Fudong areas which are 
the representative showcases of Chinese economic reform, and proposed an alternative way 
to renovate North Korea’s backward economy through rapid development of science and 
technology.  The newspaper constantly stressed development of Information Technology 
(IT); development of the industrial structure to meet the demand of the IT era; pragmatic and 
innovative economic activities; and modernisation of the economy.  The role of scientists, 
technicians, computer specialists and intellectuals were concurrently emphasized.  The newly 
defined goal, building “Kangsung Daeguk”, however, was mentioned less frequently from 
2003, as focus of the regime shifted to security matters vis-à-vis the nuclear tension and the 
hard-line stance of the Bush administration.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Rodong Sinmun editorial, Jan 9, 2001 
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Figure 4. Changing Ideology in North Korea 
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The figure above illustrates the overall change of ideology and legitimating value 
reflected in Rodong Sinmun between 1980 and 2004.  It clearly shows that Marxism-
Leninism is long gone as an ideological reference for the North Korean regime.  The ‘Juche’ 
ideology is on the declining mode.  The red banner ideology appeared for a short term, but it 
was not sufficient to rationalize regime continuation in the rapidly changing environment or 
provide ideological platform for Kim Jong Il’s military-oriented ruling style. The ‘military-
first’ ideology, on the other hand, is sharply rising as a dominant rhetoric from 1999.  The 
‘military-first’ rhetoric no longer represents a mere political slogan or a strategy for crisis 
management.  It has been promoted to set a system of value, social norm, and effective 
system of authority under the Kim Jong Il leadership.  It is premature to conclude whether 
the military-first ideology can successfully replace Juche ideology, which has been playing 
the backbone of the North Korean regime since 1960s, in providing a new alternative value.   
Facing security threat, however, the North Korean ruling elite would find the ‘military-first’ 
ideology useful to justify the changing nature of the regime for the time being.  
 
 5. Conclusion 
Following the breakdown of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 
some North Korea watchers predicted North Korea’s imminent collapse.  They continuously 
talked about crisis in North Korea and questioned its regime sustainability throughout the 
1990s.  North Korea, however, has managed to avoid the fate of other socialist countries until 
the present.  One way to approach the North Korean regime’s survival is to look at the 
leadership’s capacity to remould formal rationality and to switch dominant legitimating mode.  
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The study of Rodong Sinmun editorials between 1980 and 2004 clearly shows that important 
issues and policy subject that concerned the regime varied over time and that the leadership 
carried out constant changes in its political rationality to provide legitimacy to the surviving 
North Korean regime.  It also shows an interesting changing pattern of policy focus, 
depending on the degree of threat North Korea perceives from various internal and external 
circumstances.  For instance, the newspaper editorials largely discuss socio-political and 
military issues when North Korea feels under threat.  When the regime feels relatively secure, 
on the other hand, the editorials tend to focus more on improving economy and foreign 
relations.  
 
The 1980s was a period of economic development and international socialist 
solidarity.  Economic issues were dominantly discussed in editorials throughout the 1980s, 
and subjects concerning foreign relations were frequently discussed in the early part of the 
80s.  It was evident from the analysis that the main concerns of the regime rested mainly on 
economic development, socialist economic construction through mobilisation and building 
diplomatic ties with other socialist countries.  The eudaemonic and goal-rational types were 
the dominant modes of legitimation under the relatively stable Kim Il Sung leadership.   
 
The 1990s was a period of struggle for regime survival.  Desperate efforts of the 
North Korean leadership to sustain the socialist system and to avoid any political instability 
were clearly reflected in a variation of rhetoric appeared in this period of time.  Discussion of 
safeguarding the “our-style socialism” followed the disintegration of the socialist bloc, in 
which unity and loyalty to the Party and the leader as well as the revolutionary spirit of the 
people were constantly stressed.  The newspaper concentrated on ideological indoctrination, 
calling for unity and loyalty to the Party and the leader, and highlighted the uniqueness and 
superiority of the North Korean style of socialism.  After the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, 
the leadership propagated various symbols and slogans in search for new identity based on 
the official nationalist and new traditional modes of legitimation.  New political rhetoric was 
constantly created and that different slogans were stressed at different times, which suggests 
that the North Korean ruling group unceasingly attempted to renew and renegotiate official 
rationality in the midst of transitory period of leadership change.  Emerged were new slogans 
such as “red banner philosophy,” “painful march for socialism,” “military-first politics,” and 
“building a strong and prosperous nation.”  These slogans not only mirrored the direction of 
political development in North Korea, but also provided a new type of justification and goal 
for the North Korean regime.   
 
If safeguarding the socialist system and maintaining regime stability were the top 
priority in the 1990s, the regime relatively loosened up the tension in the new century.  Upon 
securing some stability in his leadership, Kim Jong Il initiated a radical shift in the policy 
directives in 2001 such as proposing innovative economic development focusing on science 
and technology and improving foreign relations.  A new goal of building a strong country 
(Kangsung Daeguk) was brought forward by the leadership along with the idea of 
“practicality and renovation in thinking”.  North Korea’s active engagement with other 
countries, including South Korea, China, Russia, Japan and the E.U. member states, put an 
end to its closed-door policy of the 1990s.  It was apparent that Kim Jong Il attempted a form 
of goal-rational and foreign recognition legitimation at the start of the 21st Century.  This 
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trend, however, discontinued when the increasing friction between North Korea and the U.S. 
brought back the regime’s attention to security.  Reacting to the external threat, the present 
North Korean regime seems to be utterly dependent on its survival strategy of building a 
military-oriented state on the basis of the ‘military first’ ideology and using the nuclear card.   
 
Every political system has a legitimating value system whereby the regime structure, 
the structure of authority relations between the political leaders and the people, is rationalized.  
The legitimating value in the socialist regime, as Chalmers Johnson has pointed out, is 
usually initiated and rationalized by the ruling elite.25  Successful “top-down” legitimation is 
thus possible when the ruling group is unified and when the elite feels a strong identity with 
the regime.  Political stability is often the artificial product of shrewd decisions made by a 
cohesive elite that share basic agreement and consensus about the desirability of a politically 
stable system, in its current form, and the nature and goals towards which the system is 
ostensibly moving.  Therefore, regime survival and disintegration very much depends on 
whether the ruling elite is capable and willing to shift the legitimating mode to ensure regime 
continuity and prolong its rule. Legitimacy has ideological foundations and beliefs, which are 
subject to change.  All the substitute supports, such as nationalism, promise for a better future 
and new propaganda can sustain the system for a time.  Following this logic, it may be 
argued that survival of the North Korean regime owes to successful “top-down” legitimation 
at the time of crises by a unified ruling elite who is willing and capable of ideological 
manipulation and propaganda management.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25  Chalmers Johnson, Change in Communist Systems,(Stanford University Press, 1970), pp.9-10 
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